"If this (the shortages) illustrates the extent of their reliance on South Africa, then it is all good and well," Mbeki is quoted as saying quite omniously for the Mugabe regime.
For long, many Zimbabweans and South Africans have criticised the South African president's so-called "quiet diplomacy." Among them, former Zimbabwe information guru turned opposition MP, Jonathan Moyo waded into the fray fresh from his ignominious fall from the Zanu PF gravy train. Here I republish that article written last year coutersy of Trevor Ncube's Mail and Guardian. I advise that you also read my earlier article, "Lest We Forget..." to give a bit of context as to where Jonathan Moyo is coming from.
What is Thabo Mbeki trying to achieve?
By Jonathan Moyo Mail and Guardian ©2005
11 August 2005
President Thabo Mbeki and his government are desperately trying to limit public embarrassment over the widely publicised political conditions they have reportedly attached to an emergency bail-out for President Robert Mugabe. They should have followed the diplomatic principle enunciated by classical Greek dramatist Euripides - that a foreign ally need not own the land it seeks to help.
In fairness, there is no evidence that Mbeki wants to own Zimbabwe. But there are many indications that he wants to own the solution to the Zimbabwean crisis.
Mbeki's so-called "quiet diplomacy" has now become a very loud affair. For the first time his efforts to broker a solution to the Zimbabwean quagmire are at risk of irretrievably crumbling, with far--reaching consequences for South Africa's capacity to influence regional and continental affairs. It seems Mugabe has once more outfoxed Mbeki in a high-stakes diplomatic standoff over the resolution of the crisis that has dogged the latter's presidency since 1999.
Through his outburst earlier this week against South African calls for him to open new dialogue with the opposition, the Zimbabwean president has opportunistically put himself in a win-win position over the loan debacle. Either his beleaguered Zanu-PF government will ultimately get the loan sought from South Africa, with the usual financial securities but without the reported political conditions attached to it, or South Africa will not grant the loan because of Mugabe's rejection of the political conditions. In the latter case, Mbeki will be exposed as a duplicitous Machiavellian who conveniently waves the pan-African solidarity flag while using methods that smack of imperialism against a desperate neighbour and comrade in need.
The way the political conditionality was reported in the South African media over the weekend did not help Mbeki. There was an authoritative ring to the coverage that the South African government had given Mugabe and Zanu-PF a week to sign up to a series of tough reforms that included talking to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), adopting a new constitution with the agreement of the MDC, repealing media and security laws, undoing the negative consequences of the recent land reform programme and holding fresh elections. Clearly, the reports had been planted or leaked by government sources.
In diplomacy, whether quiet or loud, parties committed to the attainment of well-defined objectives in sensitive negotiations do not leak or plant media reports before agreement has been reached.
To do so guarantees the collapse of negotiations. Mugabe's outburst against the reported political conditionality could have been avoided by keeping the tricky aspects of the horse-trading under wraps until the necessary signatures were appended.
Why, then, did the leaks happen? Perhaps those responsible were mischievous elements in, or associated with, the South African government, who did not want the loan deal successfully concluded from the outset. The leak could also have come from the International Monetary Fund, or even Zimbabwean government officials who wanted to ensure that the deal went nowhere because they are profiting from the crisis.
From the outset, the Zimbabwean government's position was that any loan would be a purely financial transaction with the usual guarantees and securities put up by the central banks and treasuries of the two nations, without a political trade-off.
Two recent statements by Mbeki must have reinforced Mugabe's belief that South Africa was on his side and would not try to force political concessions from him. In one case, he said the Zimbabwean government had not undertaken a meaningful land reform programme in the 1980s and early 1990s because African states, through Tanzania's Mwalimu Nyerere, persuaded Mugabe not to scare South African whites before the end of apartheid and the attainment of democracy in South Africa.
As Mugabe has said this all along, this must have been music to his ears.
On another occasion, Mbeki said the debt owed by Zimbabwe was legitimate and had nothing to do with corruption. Debt had started accumulating soon after independence in 1980 when the Zimbabwe government embarked on education and health reforms to redress racial imbalances.
If Mbeki understood these two fundamental issues, Mugabe reasoned, he would be the last to turn a straightforward loan request into a diplomatic trap using the political conditions all Third World countries detest. This is why in his outburst this week, Mugabe referred to Mbeki and the ANC government as "those we expected to know better".
Mbeki's diplomatic initiative to resolve the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis has been conspicuous by its lack of clear and well-defined objectives that can be measured in determining the initiative's failure or success.
What exactly does he want to achieve? What are the objectives of "quiet diplomacy"? Is he trying to bring the MDC to power, to keep Zanu-PF in power, or get Zanu-PF and the MDC to form a coalition government, or what?
"Getting Zimbabweans to resolve their own problems by talking to each other" is not an objective worthy of a diplomatic onslaught. You can get Zimbabweans to talk to each other without agreeing on anything until the cows come home. You can also get Zanu-PF and the MDC to agree to a coalition government where a few MDC leaders become ministers or deputy ministers. This, too, would not lead to any changes in Zimbabwe's national governance or policies, except that MDC ministers would effectively become Zanu-PF.
Some Zanu-PF old-guard elements, supported by some MDC leaders, want Mugabe arm-twisted into accepting the reported political conditions, with a reform time-table that would involve him retiring in 2008 and scrapping presidential elections due then in order to hold them together with parliamentary elections in 2010. At that stage, a new constitution agreed between Zanu-PF and the MDC would come into effect, while 2008 to 2010 would be a transitional period presided over by Joyce Mujuru as caretaker president and Zanu-PF's presidential candidate in 2010.
This too would not resolve the ongoing crisis in terms of the objectionable policies that are bleeding Zimbabwe.
If Mbeki's quiet diplomacy seeks any of the above, the contradictions exposed by the loan debacle are certain to be its graveyard. This is because the Zimbabwean crisis has become wider and deeper than Mbeki's noisy quiet diplomacy can deal with. Zimbabweans have lost all hope not just in Mugabe and Zanu-PF, but also in Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC. They are looking for an ideological and policy alternative to ensure that Zimbabwe will never again be a colony, never again be a tyranny and never again be a basket case.
Jonathan Moyo is a Zimbabwean MP and Robert Mugabe's former information chief
Moyo: That was then ...
"There is no food crisis in Zimbabwe. There is no food crisis in Bulawayo." -- September 22 2004
"Where the army is deployed, people should not expect a picnic." -- On the deployment of the army against civilians, April 11 2003
"Mercenaries of any kind, whether carrying the sword or the pen, must and will be exposed, and they will suffer the full consequences of the law." -- March 11 2004
"Next time you send us a letter, we will put it in the dustbin and we have concluded that you do not deserve to be taken seriously." -- In a reply to a letter of complaint by Reporters Sans Frontires after the arrest of journalists in Zimbabwe, April 17 2002
"It is absolutely unreasonable to suggest that because we have undertaken to curb violence that there should be no single person throwing a stone in Zimbabwe. We're talking about Zimbabwe, not heaven." -- On pre-election violence, March 3 2002
"Thomas Jefferson said it was better to have newspapers without government. He was very, very wrong. It is far better to have government without newspapers." -- February 1 2002
"If the apartheid press expects us to treat them with kid gloves and allow them to roam around our country, then they don't understand where they are." -- On the South African media, December 19 2001
"When a political party has no loyalty, then it should not expect to be treated fairly." -- On denying media access to the opposition MDC, October 4 2004
"It is clear to anyone who can read the writing on the wall that Zanu-PF is the future." -- July 31 2001
"An article is not a bible where you have written the truth once and for all and for all time, and the environment is frozen. One has to look at the context." -- On his metamorphosis from critic to Mugabe apologist, March 1 2001
"A passport is a privilege and not a right." -- On the withdrawal of passports of government critics, February 16 2001
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